The key distinction in today's section is between wrong acts that are committed unintentionally, and those that are committed intentionally. Chapter 5:14-19 deals with the former, and chapter 6:1-7 deals with the latter. What seems to distinguish them most is the manner in which they cause one to sin. In 5:14, God mentions cases in which one "commits a breach of faith and sins unintentionally." In 6:1, it is cases where one "sins and commits a breach of faith." To me, the use of 'and' in those two cases suggests causation. In the first case, one commits a breach of faith by accidentally breaking the law, and that causes one to have sinned. In the second, one breaks the law, and this sin causes a breach of faith. But the distinction is difficult to maintain, especially since 6:4-5 says, "if he has sinned and has realized his guilt...he shall restore [what he as taken] in full...and give it to him to whom it belongs on the day he realizes his guilt." The seems to imply that, at the time of acting, the sinner didn't realize his action was wrong, so why isn't this just another case of unintentional sinning?
There are three answers to my question I can conveniently think of. One is that there is no difference between the chapter 5 and 6 cases, and the reversal of phrasing I highlighted is purely stylistic. On this view, 6:1-7 is meant to reinforce the badness of illegitimately acquiring the property of others, not because these sins aren't a subset of those mentioned in 5:17, but because taking from others is something we are especially likely to do and to attempt to justify. Another answer is that the distinction between the chapters 5 and 6 cases is epistemic (knowledge related). On this view, the laws referred to in 5:14-19 are not ones that our consciences would normally tell us not to break, whereas the ones in 6:1-7 are. The claim here would be that we can only really break a law unintentionally when it is not a relatively fundamental tenant of morality. And while a command to not steal is plausibly a fundamental tenant of this kind, proper conduct in the tabernacle (among other things) plausibly is not. The third answer is metaphysical, having to do with the law-breaking actions themselves. Here the idea is that when one sins unintentionally, one is performing action A, and as a consequence also performs action B. For instance, one might watch a movie (action A) and as a consequence also disturb the neighbors (action B). So in the chapter 5 cases, one is attempting to perform a legitimate action, but also accidentally doing something else that breaks a law. By contrast, in the chapter 6 cases, one intentionally performs an action (say, theft) that is itself a sin.
The metaphysical reading strikes me as highly problematic for a couple of reasons. One is that it relies on a questionable ability to clearly individuate actions. If you try to do this yourself with real cases of action, I promise that you will find it super difficult. At what level of generality are actions properly described? When are consequences unintentional? When do we have one action with several consequences versus several actions? Can a person perform multiple actions simultaneously? Even setting these issues aside, I am sure it would not be all that difficult to come up with cases in which it was very unclear whether we were dealing with a chapter 5 or 6 sort of case. Between the epistemic and stylistic readings, I don't see an obvious superior. What's more, each seems to have its own downside. The stylistic reading doesn't obviously do justice to the emphasis on unintentionality in chapter 5, and any attempt to apply the epistemic reading seems to require a very developed moral psychology. In some sense, one might argue that the distinctions don't matter in practice so long as one can recognize that one's action falls into one of the three categories since the procedure for all three is exactly the same. Even so, it would be nice to know why the cases are listed separately.
Well, there you go--the most inconclusive entry yet (maybe). Regardless, have a wonderful day, and God bless.
There are three answers to my question I can conveniently think of. One is that there is no difference between the chapter 5 and 6 cases, and the reversal of phrasing I highlighted is purely stylistic. On this view, 6:1-7 is meant to reinforce the badness of illegitimately acquiring the property of others, not because these sins aren't a subset of those mentioned in 5:17, but because taking from others is something we are especially likely to do and to attempt to justify. Another answer is that the distinction between the chapters 5 and 6 cases is epistemic (knowledge related). On this view, the laws referred to in 5:14-19 are not ones that our consciences would normally tell us not to break, whereas the ones in 6:1-7 are. The claim here would be that we can only really break a law unintentionally when it is not a relatively fundamental tenant of morality. And while a command to not steal is plausibly a fundamental tenant of this kind, proper conduct in the tabernacle (among other things) plausibly is not. The third answer is metaphysical, having to do with the law-breaking actions themselves. Here the idea is that when one sins unintentionally, one is performing action A, and as a consequence also performs action B. For instance, one might watch a movie (action A) and as a consequence also disturb the neighbors (action B). So in the chapter 5 cases, one is attempting to perform a legitimate action, but also accidentally doing something else that breaks a law. By contrast, in the chapter 6 cases, one intentionally performs an action (say, theft) that is itself a sin.
The metaphysical reading strikes me as highly problematic for a couple of reasons. One is that it relies on a questionable ability to clearly individuate actions. If you try to do this yourself with real cases of action, I promise that you will find it super difficult. At what level of generality are actions properly described? When are consequences unintentional? When do we have one action with several consequences versus several actions? Can a person perform multiple actions simultaneously? Even setting these issues aside, I am sure it would not be all that difficult to come up with cases in which it was very unclear whether we were dealing with a chapter 5 or 6 sort of case. Between the epistemic and stylistic readings, I don't see an obvious superior. What's more, each seems to have its own downside. The stylistic reading doesn't obviously do justice to the emphasis on unintentionality in chapter 5, and any attempt to apply the epistemic reading seems to require a very developed moral psychology. In some sense, one might argue that the distinctions don't matter in practice so long as one can recognize that one's action falls into one of the three categories since the procedure for all three is exactly the same. Even so, it would be nice to know why the cases are listed separately.
Well, there you go--the most inconclusive entry yet (maybe). Regardless, have a wonderful day, and God bless.
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